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We explore the link between portfolio home bias and consumption risk sharing among Italian 
regions using aggregated household level information on consumption, income and portfolio 
holdings. We propose to use data on equity fund ownership to proxy for regional home bias: 
equity funds are typically diversified at the national or international level and will therefore 
provide interregional diversification. In assessing the impact of equity fund ownership on 
interregional risk sharing we distinguish between two dimensions: variation in the share of 
equity funds in fund-holder's wealth (the intensive margin) and variation in the fraction of 
households that hold funds (the extensive margin). We find that equity fund ownership is an 
important determinant of interregional risk sharing. First, diversification incentives 
qualitatively line up with actually observed portfolio choices: fund holders in regions where 
households are particularly exposed to region-specific labor income risk hold a larger fraction 
of their wealth in (out-of-region) funds. Secondly, for a region as a whole, risk sharing 
increases in both the intensive and the extensive margins of diversification and the two 
margins reinforce each other. The marginal effect of wider equity fund participation seems 
particularly strong, suggesting that policies aimed at increasing equity market participation 
could help foster better interregional risk sharing. 
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We have received substantive comments during presentations at the CESifo Area Conference 
on Macro, Money and International Finance and at the University of Zurich. Discussions with 
Michel Beine and Bent Sørensen were very fruitful. 1 Introduction
Risk sharing between households, regions and nations has been the focus of an important
and continually growing literature over the last decade.1 Still, little is known to date about
the link between portfolio structure and consumption risk sharing at the regional level. In
this paper, we ask two questions. First, how do region-specic risks aect regional home
bias in household portfolios? And, secondly, how does household portfolio diversication
aect interregional risk sharing? By attempting to get at these issues, we hope to help close
an important gap, as we see it, between the macroeconomic literature on interregional risk
sharing and the literature on risk sharing and portfolio choice at the household level.
Our analysis is based on the Survey of Household Income and Wealth by the Banca
d'Italia and uses data from 1987 to 2004. This data set is particularly suited for our purposes
here, since it contains both detailed information on household income and consumption
patterns as well as on the household's portfolio of real and nancial assets. Household level
data sets do not contain direct information about the cross-regional allocation of household
assets, though. We therefore propose to proxy for out-of-region equity ownership through
household level information about ownership of equity mutual fund shares. Our motivation
for doing so is that equity funds are generally managed at a national or even international
level, so that through ownership of mutual fund shares the household eectively achieves
interregional diversication.
Importantly, our method of aggregating household level data to obtain information on
cross-region asset ownership, allows us to distinguish between two dimensions of regional
diversication: increased participation in interregional asset markets (here: ownership of
mutual funds) improves diversication along the extensive margin, whereas we refer to an
increase in the share of wealth held in out-of-region assets as improved diversication along
the intensive margin. We nd this distinction important in exploring the link between
1Household level analyses start with Mace (1991) and Cochrane (1991) and Townsend (1994). Asdrubali,
Srensen and Yosha (1996), Hess and Shin (2000), and von Hagen (2000) are prominent examples of papers
that have studied the extent of risk sharing between regions. Srensen and Yosha (1998), van Wincoop
(1999) and Becker and Homann (2006) have looked at risk sharing between countries.
2regional home bias and risk sharing and, specically, in answering our two questions above.
In our answer to the rst question, our point of departure is an observation from stan-
dard portfolio theory: ceteris paribus, a household's incentive to invest into out-of-region
assets rises in the correlation of its labor income with local (i.e. region-specic) economic
conditions.2 Along the intensive margin, we nd this prediction fullled: in regions where
households are more strongly exposed to region-specic risk, those households that do own
funds actually hold more of them. But we nd that exposure to local economic shocks cannot
explain equity fund participation rates; also when viewed through the lens of interregional
risk sharing, non-participation remains a puzzle.
So, do more diversied regions share more risk overall? Again, our answer is a qualied
yes. We nd that consumption risk sharing with the rest of the country is better in regions
in which more households participate in funds and where households hold a relatively large
fraction of their wealth in such instruments. The interaction between the extensive and
intensive margins of diversication plays a key role: the eects of higher fund holdings
on aggregate risk sharing are much stronger when fund ownership is widespread in the
population. Over our sample period, 1989-2004, increasing the participation rate by one
percentage point would have led to an about 2 percentage point increase in aggregate risk
sharing. Conversely, the eect of inducing households to allocate a larger fraction of their
wealth to funds is much smaller. We nd the intensive margin to be of signicance mainly
during the bull market of the late 1990s, when unprecedentedly high participation rates
and high stock market valuations allowed many households to decouple consumption from
region-specic income shocks.
These ndings suggest that stock market and in particular, equity fund participation, is
strongly associated with interregional diversication and that policies aimed at increasing
participation rates could possibly be highly eective in improving the nationwide pooling
of household level risks.
Our results also add important regional evidence to a recent literature in macroeco-
2See e.g. Lucas and Heaton (2000, Econ J.) on the role of labour income risk for portfolio choice.
3nomics and international nance that documents that portfolio diversication and con-
sumption risk sharing go hand in hand at the international level. Srensen, Yosha, Wu and
Zu (2007) show that countries with larger international asset positions have larger cross-
border capital income ows and share more risk. Srensen et al. therefore argue that the
equity home bias puzzle and the lack of international consumption risk sharing are twin puz-
zles separated at birth. Our analysis here shows that this logic carries over to the regional
and even to the household level.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We describe our data and empir-
ical implementation in detail in the next section. Section three provides rst descriptive
statistics on the characteristics of fund-owning and non-fund-owning households. Section
four presents our main results . We rst explore a simple proposition: basic portfolio the-
ory would suggest that, ceteris paribus, a household's incentive to invest into out-of-region
assets rises in the correlation of its labor income with region-specic economic conditions.
We show that this is indeed the case: regions where households are more strongly exposed
to region-specic risk have more fund owners and these fund owners invest a larger fraction
of their wealth into mutual funds. We then go on to investigate whether, in turn, regions
with lower 'home' bias achieve better risk sharing. Section ve summarizes and concludes.
2 Data and Empirical Implementation
2.1 The Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW)
Our empirical analysis draws on a large-scale, public-use micro data set. The Italian Survey
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) gathers information on household income, con-
sumption and wealth, which makes it particularly well suited for our purposes. The SHIW
is collected by the Bank of Italy, is available from 1977 onwards and has been run on a
yearly basis until 1987 (with the exception of 1985) and every other year since then (with
the exception of 1995-1998 with a 3-year gap between surveys). From 1987 onwards, the
set of questions asked to respondents stabilized, allowing for consistent analyses over longer
time horizons. We concentrate our analysis on the period 1987-2004, thus covering nearly
4two decades. The sample size is about 8,000 households per survey. Apart from a small
fraction of panel households,3 the SHIW consists of repeated cross-sections. This, however,
is not a problem for our analysis here, since we are interested in regional aggregates to
understand risk sharing patterns.
2.2 Forming Synthetic Panel Groups
We base our analysis on two main samples: one for regional totals, and one restricted to
fund-owning households within regions. We form synthetic panel groups based on region
of residence and fund-owner status to obtain a panel of region-year observations for all
households and a panel of region-year observations for fund-owning households alone. Under
the sampling plan of the SHIW, each household is assigned a weight inversely proportional
to its probability of inclusion in the sample; the weights are supposed to align the structure
of the sample with that of the population with respect to several known characteristics.
We use these sampling weights to compute region-level per capita variables, separately for
all households and for fund-owning households. The use of synthetic panel groups follows
Attanasio and Davis (1996), who analyze repeated cross-sectional data from the American
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to study the eect of relative wage movements on
the distribution of consumption. Whereas they form panel groups by birth cohorts and
education level of household head, our focus on regional risk-sharing leads us to build region-
level synthetic panel groups. The use of synthetic panel groups constructed from household-
level data has several advantages. First, whereas individual-level studies potentially suer
from endogeneity of income (e.g. endogenous labor supply), grouped data averages out
individual-level idiosyncracies. Secondly, and dierently >from regional accounts data, our
household-level data contain information on fund-owning characteristics that allow us to
look at dierent household types instead of at (only) a single representative household, as
has virtually all of the earlier literature on regional risk sharing.
Our regional entities are the twenty administrative Italian regions: 1. Piemonte 2. Valle
3The number of households that can be followed for 3 or more waves is too small to allow for an analysis
of idiosyncratic household income and consumption risks over time.
5d'Aosta 3. Lombardia 4. Trentino/Alto Adige 5, Veneto 6. Friuli/Venezia-Giulia 7. Liguria
8. Emilia-Romagna 9. Tuscany (Toscana) 10. Umbria 11. Marche 12. Lazio 13. Abruzzo
14. Molise 15. Campania 16. Puglia 17. Basilicata 18. Calabria 19. Sicily (Sicilia) 20.
Sardegna. However, in some regions and years, the SHIW has only very few households
owning stocks or mutual funds. In addition, due to the repeated cross-section nature of
the data set these households change over time, so that it becomes virtually impossible to
form a meaningful synthetic panel group of fund-owning households for some of the smaller
regions. In our empirical analysis, we take account of this by forming some synthetic panel
groups based on aggregates over several regions. Specically, we merge Val d'Aosta with
Piemonte, Umbria with Tuscany, Molise with Puglia, Basilicata and Sicily with Calabria
and Sardegna with Lazio. While we experimented with alternative groupings, we note that
none of our results proved sensitive to this.
3 Measuring interregional diversication through mutual fund
ownership
Our main interest in this paper is to relate cross-regional risk sharing to household level
portfolio choice. Regional portfolios are the result of decisions at the household level. In
our analysis we therefore distinguish between households that own out-of-region productive
assets (i.e. equity) and households that do not. However, unlike at the international level,
data on regional portfolios do not exist. We therefore proxy ownership of out-of-region
productive assets with mutual fund ownership. The motivation for this choice is that most
mutual funds will hold a portfolio that is to the least nationally, if not internationally
diversied.
In this section, we rst provide some descriptives on the characteristics of fund-owning
and non-fund owning households. We then suggest and discuss several measures of inter-
regional diversication that make use of fund-ownership information and that provide the
basis of our further analysis.
63.1 Mutual fund ownership: some descriptives
Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics about household owning mutual funds relative to
the average of the population.4 To compare the development of these characteristics over
time, we report numbers from the rst (1987) and last (2004) year of our sample period
. The numbers suggest that owners of mutual fund shares have above average wealth
and high income. They are also more likely than the national average to be self-employed,
either in the free professions or as the owner-manager of their own or their family's business.
However, our comparison over time clearly shows that fund holders were a more distinct
group back in 1987 than they are in 2004. Whereas in 1987, the fraction of fund-owners with
an upper-secondary schooling degree or more exceeded that of the population average by
far (75.2% vs. 39.2%), in 2004, that fraction actually falls in group of fund-owners whereas
in the population as a whole, there is a marked increase (74.8% vs. 50.1%). Similarly the
fraction of fund-owning household with self-employment income decreases from 47.3% to
30.8%. This reects the trend for widening stock market participation and more widespread
fund holdings. Over our sample period, many relatively less auent households seem to
have gained access to equity markets as is suggested in the marked decline in net disposable
income experienced by the average fund-owning household.
Table 2 provides a summary of asset portfolio characteristics for fund-holders and non-
fund-holders. Both groups have similar ratios of real assets to total net wealth. But the
composition of the nancial asset portfolio is quite dierent. Fund holders hold a much
larger fraction { roundabout a third in 1987 and almost two thirds in 2004 { of their
nancial wealth in 'Other securities'. This asset category includes assets that are traded in
national capital markets such as the mutual fund shares that provide the basis for our cut
at the data here, but also foreign government securities, equity held outside of funds etc.
Clearly, ownership of mutual fund shares can only be an imperfect measure of the
interregional diversication of households. While our focus here is on household ownership
4We consider as fund holders all households that report positive mutual fund holdings. We also exper-
imented with various threshold levels, without any signicant eect on any of the results reported in the
paper.
7of out-of-region equity, households could also own other out-of-region assets. Bonds or
deposits may help countries to smooth consumption out of current income; households
could also own productive capital in other regions directly or through ownership of a private
business. Our data set does however not allow us to identify such out-of-region ownership
of equity or { for that matter { of bonds and deposits. Nor are we aware of any outside
data that would allow us to do so. Against the backdrop of these considerations, household
information on mutual fund ownership is, therefore, almost certainly a conservative proxy
of actual interregional equity cross-holdings.
Table 3 compares the standard deviations of growth rates in (labour) income, consump-
tion5 and net wealth6 across the two subgroups. As is apparent, fund-holders have con-
siderably more volatile income and consumption ows and much more volatile wealth than
their non-fund owning counterparts { a result that suggests that fund owners face more
idiosyncratic risk than the population average. This nding is in line with the ndings
reported in Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) for stock holders.
Table 4 shows cross-regional income and consumption correlations. For each Italian
region, column 1 provides the correlation of the consumption of fund owners residing in the
respective region with that of other fund owners in the rest of Italy. Column 2 gives the
analogous correlation for non-fund holders. In columns 3 and 4 we repeat the same exercise
for income. The cross-regional consumption correlation of fund owners is lower than that of
non-fund owners in 12 of 14 (aggregated) regions. For income this is true in 11 cases. The
average consumption correlation for fund owners is 0.096, that for other households 0.47.
For income, the respective correlations are 0.12 and 0.40.
The purely descriptive evidence in Tables 3 and 4 suggests that { as a group { fund
holders seem to face lots more idiosyncratic risk and that they achieve much less cross-
regional risk sharing than do non-fund holders. This ties in with the evidence in Tables 1
and 2 where we nd that fund owners are more likely to be self-employed and hold a much
5Our measure of consumption is household expenditure on non-durables. This measure excludes purchases
of precious objects, cars, furniture etc.
6Net wealth is measured as value of real assets plus nancial assets minus nancial liabilities.
8larger share of their wealth in business property. Heaton and Lucas (2000 J.Finance) have
prominently argued that proprietors constitute an important group of shareholders that is
also subject to non-insurable background risk. To the extent that fund-owners tend to be
proprietors, a higher share of fund owners may simply imply a lot more uninsurable region-
specic risk for them. In fact, Agronin (2003) provides evidence based on U.S. state level
data that regions with more small, proprietary businesses achieve less income insurance.
These ndings may help rationalize the unconditional correlations we observe here.7
In this paper, we abstain from an attempt to explain why households own stocks or
mutual funds. Our approach is more modest: given that we observe that certain households
participate in stock markets { and in particular: mutual funds { we ask to what extent
cross-regional variation in the incentives to invest into out-of-region assets can explain
cross-regional variation in mutual fund ownership { both along the intensive as well as the
extensive margins. We then ask, to what extent the interaction between these two margins
can explain the relative success of a region as a whole in obtaining interregional consumption
risk sharing. We start by describing our diversication measures.
3.2 Measures of interregional diversication: intensive and extensive mar-
gins
We now use the mutual fund holding characteristics discussed in the previous subsection to
obtain measures of interregional diversication (or, for that matter: home bias). Our data
set allows us to distinguish between two dimensions of interregional diversication: variation
across regions in the the fraction of the wealth held in mutual funds by households that
already own fund measures the intensive margin. Variation in mutual fund participation,
i.e. the fraction of all households in the region that own mutual funds at all measures the
extensive margin.8
7Note that there is a version of the Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) quantity puzzle in these household
group data: the average cross-regional consumption correlations of fund-owners is even lower than the average
correlation in their respective incomes.
8We experimented with thresholds other than zero (strictly positive fund-holdings), e.g. more than
2,000 EUR as minimum fund holdings to be classied as a fund-owning households, but results were largely
9We examine two measures of diversication along the intensive margin: our rst mea-
sure puts the ratio of households' mutual fund holdings to the value of their real assets.
This measure emphasizes the weight of fund owners out-of-region (i.e. mutual fund) assets
relative to what one might consider their local assets, notably owner occupied housing. We
call this measure MFW. As a second measure of diversication along the intensive margin,
we consider mutual fund holdings relative to fund owners' labor income. We call this ratio
MFY . As a measure of diversication along the extensive margin we use the fraction of
households in a given region that own mutual funds, i.e. the mutual fund participation rate.
Table 5 gives an overview of the regional variation in our diversication measures. As is
apparent, there is a lot of dispersion in mutual fund ownership rates across regions. Fund
ownership is much more widespread in the northern regions such as Lombardia and Emilia-
Romagna, with 13 and 15 percent respectively, whereas in the southern regions such as
Calabria, Basilicata and Sicilia less than 2 percent of households hold mutual funds.
The share of wealth held in mutual funds, be it relative to local (i.e. housing) assets or
relative to income, still varies widely across regions., but somewhat less than does the fund
participation. Furthermore, the north-south divide, while present, is not quite as clear-cut
as it appears for the participation rates. Note that the two intensity measures MFW and
MFY are also very highly correlated across regions.
4 Results
4.1 Incentives for interregional diversication and household portfolios
In examining the link between interregional risk sharing and household portfolio character-
istics we take guidance from some simple principles of portfolio theory: the more exposed a
household's labor income is to region-specic economic conditions, the lower should ceteris
paribus be the share of local assets that the household would optimally want to hold in its
portfolio. Hence, the share of out-of-region assets should increase for households that are
unaected.
10very exposed to region-specic risk.
We gauge the exposure of labor income to local economic conditions through the coef-
cient of a regression of household labor income on regional GDP growth
yki
t = ki(gdpk
t   gdpt) + ki + vki
t (1)
where yki
t is the growth rate of labour income for household-type i in region k and ki is
a region-specic xed eect. As discussed in the previous section, we distinguish between
two household types { the average household in region k (i = all) and those households
that hold mutual funds (i = MF).
We measure region specic economic conditions through the dierence in GDP growth
rates between regions k and the national average, (gdpk
t  gdpt). The coecient ki can
then be interpreted as a measure of the sensitivity to local economic conditions.
The left panel of Figure 1 plots the estimates of ki for mutual fund holders (i = MF)
against the rst our intensive regional diversication measures, the ratio of mutual fund
holdings to local (real) assets (MFW). As is apparent, there is a clear positive link between
the two variables and the regression coecient seems highly signicant. The gure highlights
the role of region-specic risk for diversication along the intensive margin:9 in regions,
where fund holders are particularly exposed to local economic conditions, they invest a
larger share of their wealth in mutual funds.
Interestingly, there is even a positive link between fund-holders degree of diversication
(the intensive margin) and average household exposure in the regions (see right panel of
Figure 1). This suggests that there is a strong correlation between the local exposures of
fund-owners and other households. The cross-sectional correlation between the k for fund-
holders and non-fundholders is bigger than 0.5. and highly signicant. This, in turn, does
however, not imply that diversication along the extensive margin (participation rates) is
systematically higher in regions where people are strongly exposed to local economic shocks.
9To save space, we do not report the results for MFY graphically. The gure looks similar and the link
is is equally signicant.
11In the data, we nd a clearly insignicant link between mutual fund participation rates
and exposure to local economic conditions. While explaining stock market participation
is beyond the scope of our analysis here, these result seem to deepen the puzzle of non-
participation in equity markets: given that diversication incentives are broadly the same
for the two household groups, it is surprising that they react so dierently.
The coecients ki are estimated from relatively short time series samples and are
therefore likely to be imprecise. The above cross-plots can therefore at best be suggestive
of a link between these variables. We attempt to solve this problem by parametrizing the
exposure parameters ki as functions of mutual fund holdings directly. To this end, we
invert the conjectured linear relation between exposure and fund holdings underlying the




where zik is a vector of region k household group i portfolio characteristics, i
0 is a group-
specic constant and i0
1 is a vector of coecients. Specically,we choose zik
t to comprise
sample period averages of our intensive and extensive margin measures respectively as well




t   gdpt) + i0
1zik(gdpk
t   gdpt) + ki + vki
t (2)
which in turn puts us in a position to estimate i
0 and i0
1 from a panel regression. Again, ki
is the xed eect. We note that, even though in this specication, ik varies as a function
of portfolio parameters, we do not want to to interpret this relation as a causal one. We
just want to ascertain statistically that actual diversication decisions are positively related
to diversication incentives as we measure them by household exposure to region-specic
economic conditions.
We provide results for regressions of the form (2) in Table 6. In the rst column of the
table, zik consists of the intensive margin diversication measure, in the second column we
have the extensive margin. In the third column, zik includes both measures and in the fourth
12column zik is the interaction between the two measures. We nd the intuition provided by
the cross-plots largely conrmed. Panel I reports the results for mutual-fund owning house-
holds. Higher fund holdings are clearly and signicantly associated with higher exposure.
The extensive margin or the interaction between the two margins are not signicant. The
same picture also emerges in panel II, where we consider all households. It is variation along
the intensive margin { i.e. higher fund-holdings by households that already hold stocks {
rather than variation in the incidence of fund-holding households that is associated with
higher exposure.
>From the perspective of the region as whole, it is not clear a priori, along which
margin we should expect to see the diversication when households are highly exposed to
local economic conditions. Higher diversication incentives could nd their reection both
in higher fund ownership rates and/or in more substantial holdings of out-of-region assets.
Our ndings here broadly suggest that diversication incentives, measured through cor-
relations of labor income with region-specic GDP uctuations, seem to line up with actual
diversication behavior at the regional level. But, if anything, stronger diversication in-
centives seem to lead to higher fund holdings of those households that already own mutual
funds rather than to a higher propensity to hold mutual funds in the population as a whole.
Clearly, this may just reect liquidity constraints, costs of participation and other obstacles
to equity ownership: while diversication incentives may well be present for many house-
holds in the region, only those households that hold equity anyway may be able to react
to them. It is beyond the scope of the paper to explain why households participate in
equity markets, but our results suggest that non-participation is clearly a puzzle also from
an interregional risk sharing perspective and that it is likely to lead to interregional non-
diversication for many households: home bias is a phenomenon that is clearly also present
at the regional level.
134.2 Does mutual fund ownership increase interregional risk sharing?
Our analysis so far has focused on how the structure of shocks faced by households in
dierent regions aects portfolio decisions. We now turn to asking what the eects of
portfolio diversication on interregional risk sharing may be. Do fund owners as a group
systematically share more consumption risk than do non-fund owners? Do regions as a
whole share more risk if they have more fund-owning households or if fund-owners hold a
larger fraction of their wealth in mutual funds?
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Regressions of this kind have been proposed by Mace (1991) and Cochrane (1991) as tests
of the null of complete nancial markets. We propose to interpret i(k) as a measure of how
much of the idiosyncratic labor income risk of household group i in region k systematically
spills over into idiosyncratic consumption uctuations. In particular, if i(k) is unity, no
risk is shared, whereas if i(k) = 0, all risk is shared. This interpretation of i as a metric
for risk sharing was rst popularized by Asdrubali, Srensen and Yosha (1996).
We present the results obtained from regressions of this form in the rst columns of
Tables 7 and 8 respectively. Table 7 gives the estimates of i for fund-holders (i = MF)
Table 8 for all (i = all) households.
As is apparent from the rst two columns of both tables, there is no major dierence
in the actual risk sharing outcomes between the population as a whole and owners of
mutual funds. Both groups insure between 40 and 50 percent of their idiosyncratic income
shocks with MF = 0:58 and all = 0:54. Interestingly, the fraction of uninsured risk
for fund holders, i is slightly higher for fund holders. The dierence between the groups
is, however, not very big and insignicant, suggesting that fund ownership per se { the
ownership of out-of-region assets { does not necessarily imply more or less interregional risk
sharing. However, given the particular characteristics of fund-owners as we documented
them earlier, it is conceivable that an above average fraction of fund owners' idiosyncratic
14risk is non-diversiable. The fact that, in spite of this, the same fraction of all idiosyncratic
risk is shared may suggest that fund owners could ultimately be able diversify a larger
portion of their diversiable risk than the population as a whole. In this respect our results
here appear consistent with the view that fund ownership provides interregional risk sharing
ceteris paribus.
To explore the link between portfolio characteristics and interregional risk sharing more
formally, we posit a linear relation between our (region-specic) measure of risk sharing
i
u(k) and regional portfolio characteristics, so that
i(k) = 0 + i0zik
t
where zik
t is, again, a vector of region-specic characteristics. Plugging this relation into
(3), we obtain an equation with a set of interaction terms. Since we allow the vector of
characteristics to vary over time and across regions, the eect of the non-interacted zik
t will
not be adequately captured by the region-specic xed eect and we therefore also include
the non-interacted regional characteristics zik
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The vector zik
t contains our diversication measures, MFW and MFY , and the mutual
fund participation rate. We rst estimate the specications (4) for fund-owners. Our results
are reported in columns 2-4 of Table 7. For both intensive measures, MFW and MFY , the
point estimate of the marginal eect on risk sharing is negative, but only for the mutual
funds over income measure it is signicant. Interestingly, also the participation measure is
signicant, which suggests that fund holders have beneted from the possibility to share
risk with a larger group of people as mutual fund participation rates have widened.
We turn again to our results for the full sample. Table 8, columns 2-8 report the
results for the interaction term regressions (4). The coecients on the interaction terms
are correctly signed throughout: more diversication, be it along the intensive or extensive
15margin seems to lead to more risk sharing. This is true for both of our intensive proxies,
MPW and MPY . While MPY is highly signicant, the individual coecients on MPW
and on the participation measure appear only marginally so. However, an F-test that they
are jointly zero strongly rejects the null: when considered jointly, participation and higher
household level portfolio diversication do tend to be associated with more interregional
risk sharing.
We expect the impact of diversication and participation on risk sharing to reinforce
each other: if all households own mutual funds the marginal eect of an increase in MPY
or MPW on aggregate risk sharing will be higher than if only very few households hold
funds. Conversely, we would expect that wider participation induces a larger increase in
aggregate risk sharing if average fund holdings are high than if they are low. To control for
such a potential non-linearity, we also include an interaction term between our intensive and
extensive (participation) measures. Columns 7 and 8 report on this exercise . The coecient
on the interaction term is negative for both MFY and MFW: increasing diversication
along either margin increases the impact of the other margin on aggregate risk sharing.
To check the results in Tables 7 and 8 for robustness, we rerun our regressions including
a set of control variables into zik
t that theory and earlier empirical work would suggest could
have an important bearing on interregional risk sharing: an indicator of a region's economic
backwardness and remoteness (a Mezzogiorno dummy), the fraction of households that
report positive income from entrepreneurial activity. ( Heaton and Lucas (2000a,b), and
Guiso et al. (1996)) and an index of regional specialization (Kalemli-Ozcan, Srensen and
Yosha (2003)). The inclusion of these variables does not generally aect our results and none
of them was found to be individually signicant. To capture the potential inuence of other
omitted, slow moving variables such as nancial development, we also experimented with
the inclusion of a linear trend. This somewhat aects the signicance of the participation
measure, apparently due to some collinearity with the general increase in mutual fund
participation but leaves our other conclusions unaected.
Our results on the interaction between extensive and intensive margins suggest that the
16link between equity ownership and risk sharing has varied over our sample period. Regres-
sion (4) explicitly allows us to assess time variation in the marginal eect of diversication
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the time t share of mutual funds in fund-owners portfolio in region k, and PARTk
t is the
mutual fund participation rate in region k. In the remainder of this section, we report our
ndings based on our rst proxy, i.e. !k
t = MFWk
t but note that all our results remain
virtually unchanged if we use MFY .
To compute the value of the marginal eects for the average region over our entire sample





























The rst row of Table 9 provides the values of 1 + 3PART and 2 + 3! along with
the p-value of an F-test that either of these eects was zero. We nd that the marginal
eect along the intensive margin is  0:8 { a one percentage point increase in fund holdings
increases risk sharing by 0.8 percentage point, but this eect seems insignicant for the
sample period as a whole. Conversely, an increase in participation { the extensive margin {
increases aggregate risk sharing by more than 2 percentage points and this eect is highly
signicant.
17Both the mutual fund ownership rate as well as the valuation of shares and therefore the
share of wealth held in mutual funds have varied substantially over our sample period, so
that the numbers we just reported may mask considerable time-variation in the magnitude
and signicance of the marginal eects. Figure 2 illustrates this point. The left panel
plots the cross-sectional mean participation rate PARTt and the one to the right the cross-
sectional mean holdings of mutual funds in real wealth, MFWt. Both reach a peak during
the stock market boom of the late 1990s. Therefore in the following rows of Table 9, we let
the intensive and extensive marginal eects for the average region vary over time by using
the cross-regional means PARTt and !t = MFWt to compute them. For each year, this
part of the table reports the value of the variable driving the margin (i.e. PARTt for the
intensive and MFWt for the extensive margin), the value of the marginal eect and the
associated p   value.
The eect on aggregate risk sharing along the extensive margin is between 2 and 3
percentage points for most of the sample period and, with the exception for the year 1991,
also highly signicant. Conversely, the eect of higher stock holdings, the intensive margin,
is subject to considerable time variation and insignicant in all but three years { 1998, 2000
and 2002 | when it also reaches 2-3 percentage points. These are the years of the technology
bull market and the immediate aftermath, when stock market participation reached a peak,
only to drop to pre-boom levels in the years till the end of our sample.
The results here support the view that fund ownership, on the margin, does provide
interregional risk sharing, even though our results above would suggest that fund holders
do not systematically share more risk across regional boundaries. But they also show
that at least in the early part of our sample, fund holders are a special group. Widening
mutual fund ownership to households with less specic characteristics, such as high levels
of non-diversiable background risk is therefore likely to make a big impact on aggregate
risk sharing. This suggests that widening equity fund participation may be an important
avenue through which broader aggregate risk sharing can be brought about.
185 Summary and Conclusion
In international data a still small but growing literature documents that wider diversication
leads to more consumption risk sharing { home bias and the lack of risk sharing are twin
puzzles separated at birth. This paper has explored the role of interregional portfolio
diversication for the patterns and extent of interregional risk sharing between households.
Regional portfolio data do not exist. We therefore aggregate household level data from
the Banca d'Italia Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) >from 1989-2004 to
obtain an insight into this issue. As measure of out-of-region asset ownership we have
proposed to use data on mutual equity fund ownership: equity funds tend to be managed
at the national or even international level so that purchase of mutual fund shares implicitly
leads to interregional portfolio diversication.
Our analysis allows us to distinguish between two dimensions of the impact of fund
ownership on interregional risk sharing: variation in the share of mutual funds in fund-
holders' wealth captures the intensive margin of diversication. Variation in the fraction of
households that hold funds (i.e. in equity fund participation rates) is the extensive margin.
We uncover a number of interesting links between household portfolio structure and
interregional risk sharing.
First, fund owners living in regions where households are particularly exposed to region-
specic labor income risk hold more funds. This suggests that interregional diversication
incentives qualitatively line up with actual diversication patterns.
Secondly, we nd no major dierence in how much risk is shared by fund-owning and
non-fund-owning households. Since it also seems that a larger fraction of the idiosyncratic
income risk faced by fund-holders is non-diversiable (in line with the ndings in e.g. Heaton
and Lucas (2000)), our results are consistent with the view that mutual fund owners diversify
away a larger fraction of their insurable risk than do non-owners.
Third, we document that regions with higher average mutual fund holdings and larger
mutual fund participation rates tend to achieve more risk sharing with the rest of the
country. Interestingly, the level and incidence of fund holdings have a mutually reinforcing
19eect on risk sharing: the more widespread mutual fund holdings are, the larger is the
marginal eect on risk sharing of an increase of the fraction of fund-holders' wealth invested
into mutual funds. These ndings suggest that the link between regional portfolio structure
and risk sharing may vary in strength over time. Over our sample period, we estimate that
the marginal eects along both the intensive and extensive margins were highest during the
stock market boom of the late 1990s, when both asset valuations and participation rates
reached a peak.
Our results imply that policies aimed at increasing mutual fund ownership could have a
potentially important eect on interregional risk sharing. They also add a novel perspective
to an emerging literature in international nance that has recently started to investigate
the link between country portfolios an international consumption risk sharing. So far, this
literature has mostly focused on the impact of the recent decline in international portfolio
home bias on international consumption risk sharing. While our results here are not the
rst to show that home bias is clearly not only an international phenomenon (for an early
contribution see Coval and Moskowitz (1999)), they may help shift the debate towards
the role of nancial market participation { the extensive margin of diversication { for
understanding risk sharing at the aggregate level { be it between regions or countries.
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22Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Full sample and fund-holder subsample
1987 2004
Full Fund Full Fund
sample holders sample holders
Fund-holder (% of sample) 0.055 1 0.104 1
(0.227) (0.305)
Age 45.205 46.508 46.96 48.224
(9.729) (9.354) (9.41) (8.547)
Upper-secondary schooling (% of sample) 0.392 0.752 0.5 0.748
(0.488) (0.432) (0.5) (0.435)
Proprietor (% of sample) 0.29 0.473 0.247 0.31
(0.454) (0.5) (0.431) (0.463)
Transfer recipient (% of sample) 0.037 0.025 0.075 0.07
(0.19) (0.157) (0.263) (0.255)
Net labor income 16.803 22.46 16.039 21.251
(14.745) (22.244) (14.195) (17.765)
Pensions and other transfers 2.236 2.488 4.005 5.113
(4.825) (5.393) (7.381) (9.156)
Pensions and pension arrears 2.073 2.361 3.683 4.763
(4.7) (5.325) (7.229) (8.889)
Other transfers 0.163 0.127 0.322 0.35
(1.184) (1.006) (1.758) (1.815)
Net entrepreneurial income 7.901 19.752 6.257 9.458
(17.945) (29.473) (24.876) (22.584)
Property income 4.455 13.787 5.92 11.051
(8.13) (14.413) (8.003) (14.033)
Income from buildings 3.955 9.681 5.943 9.967
(6.548) (11.482) (7.7) (13.593)
Income from nancial assets 0.5 4.106 -0.023 1.084
(3.73) (6.36) (2.154) (4.139)
Net disposable income (excl asset inc.) 30.895 54.38 32.243 45.789
(21.938) (31.715) (28.975) (28.631)
Net disposable income 31.396 58.486 32.22 46.873
(23.07) (34.626) (29.21) (29.036)
Consumption 24.602 41.534 23.993 32.39
(15.618) (22.359) (13.713) (16.515)
Source: Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth shiw, 1987-2004.
Number of observations: 5,853 households in 1987, 4,776 households in 2004.
All monetary variables are in 1,000s of current EUR.Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Portfolio characteristics of fund-
holders and non-fund-holders
1987 2004
Fund non-Fund Fund non-Fund
holders holders holders holders
Real assets 322.844 112.651 350.501 184.699
(464.666) (240.32) (540.451) (310.358)
Real estate (housing and land) 219.133 83.981 284.379 154.237
(273.602) (141.266) (315.659) (223.869)
Businesses 87.756 24.039 57.685 25.776
(326.615) (160.922) (343.269) (164.97)
Valuables 15.955 4.63 8.437 4.686
(25.432) (13.162) (30.461) (12.818)
Financial assets 67.176 19.038 64.075 15.894
(73.523) (36.643) (126.561) (50.421)
Deposits, CDs, repos, postal savings certicates 23.242 13.02 15.19 10.421
(27.766) (21.722) (27.999) (29.495)
Government securities 21.145 4.777 5.248 1.757
(32.936) (20.315) (21.342) (10.427)
Other securities (bonds, mutual funds, equity etc.) 22.789 1.241 43.637 3.715
(33.904) (11.82) (108.457) (36.256)
Financial liabilities 4.451 3.031 11.192 8.246
(14.993) (16.521) (35.571) (22.763)
Fin. liab. for purchase of real estate and other real assets 3.622 2.423 9.738 7.136
(14.396) (16.278) (35.07) (22.407)
Other Financial Liabilities 0.829 0.608 1.454 1.11
(2.799) (2.522) (4.72) (3.482)
Net wealth = Real assets + Financ. assets - Financ. liab. 385.569 128.658 403.383 192.347
(497.159) (252.247) (569.263) (323.434)
Real net wealth = Real assets - Financ. liab on real estate 319.222 110.227 340.763 177.563
(465.145) (238.695) (536.416) (305.045)
Source: Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth shiw, 1987-2004.
Number of observations: 5,853 households in 1987, 4,776 households in 2004.
Net wealth = Real assets + Financ. assets - Financ. liab.
Real net wealth = Real assets - Financ. liab on real estate
All monetary variables are in 1,000s of current EUR.Table 3: Standard deviation of growth rates in consumption, income,
and wealth
Fund-holders Non-fund-holders
Non-durable consumption 0.115 0.053
Durable consumption 0.249 0.204
Labor income 0.081 0.053
Wealth 0.192 0.070




Fund non-Fund Fund non-Fund
holders holders holders holders
PIE+VDA 0.158 0.396 0.713 0.78
LOM -0.357 0.508 0.253 -0.033
TAA -0.169 0.164 0.752 -0.047
VEN 0.474 0.211 -0.277 0.273
FVG -0.183 0.44 0.198 0.42
LIG -0.529 -0.073 -0.323 -0.129
EMR -0.335 0.043 -0.052 0.338
TOS+UMB 0.523 0.472 0.235 0.488
MAR 0.102 0.742 -0.186 0.817
LAZ+SAR 0.228 0.511 0.418 0.52
ABR 0.27 0.218 0.603 0.653
CAM 0.455 0.707 -0.319 0.759
PUG+MOL -0.394 0.47 0.167 0.84
CAL+BAS+SIC -0.243 0.854 0.688 0.823
Average 0.000 0.450 0.205 0.464
Region abbreviations are as follows: PIE+VDA denotes Piemonte and Valle d'Aosta; LOM denotes
Lombardia; TAA denotes Trentino-Alto Adige; VEN denotes Veneto; FVG denotes Friuli-Venezia
Giulia; LIG denotes Liguria; EMR denotes Emilia Romagna; TOS+UMB denotes Toscana and
Umbria; MAR denotes Marche; LAZ+SAR denotes Lazio and Sardegna; ABR denotes Abruzzo;
CAM denotes Campania; PUG+MOL denotes Puglia and Molise; CAL+BAS+SIC denotes Cal-
abria, Basilicata and Sicily (Sicilia).Table 5: Extensive and intensive margins of fund ownership
Region % Fund-holders MFW MFY
PIE+VDA 0.096 0.099 0.642
LOM 0.129 0.111 0.671
TAA 0.079 0.059 0.433
VEN 0.101 0.080 0.560
FVG 0.104 0.075 0.591
LIG 0.112 0.096 0.669
EMR 0.155 0.076 0.624
TOS+UMB 0.085 0.063 0.523
MAR 0.086 0.064 0.593
LAZ+SAR 0.035 0.062 0.449
ABR 0.042 0.178 1.582
CAM 0.016 0.050 0.285
PUG+MOL 0.031 0.103 0.834
CAL+BAS+SIC 0.016 0.062 0.443
Region abbreviations are as follows: PIE+VDA denotes Piemonte and Valle d'Aosta; LOM denotes
Lombardia; TAA denotes Trentino-Alto Adige; VEN denotes Veneto; FVG denotes Friuli-Venezia
Giulia; LIG denotes Liguria; EMR denotes Emilia Romagna; TOS+UMB denotes Toscana and
Umbria; MAR denotes Marche; LAZ+SAR denotes Lazio and Sardegna; ABR denotes Abruzzo;
CAM denotes Campania; PUG+MOL denotes Puglia and Molise; CAL+BAS+SIC denotes Cal-
abria, Basilicata and Sicily (Sicilia).
MFW is the ratio of funds over fund holder's real assets (including housing).
MFY is the ratio of funds over fund holder's labor income.Table 6: Diversification incentives: Fund-holders and full sample
Panel I: Fund-owners
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MFW 162.784 186.411
(56.927) (58.382)
Participation rate -30.119 -59.867
(37.422) (37.125)
MFW * Participation rate 139.748
(399.769)
Number of obs. 112 112 112 112
R2 0.07 0.006 0.092 0.001
Panel II: Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MFW 45.906 50.965
(19.951) (20.615)
Participation rate -4.685 -12.818
(12.983) (13.109)
MFW * Participation rate 91.991
(138.168)
Number of obs. 112 112 112 112
R2 0.053 0.008 0.062 0.011
Source: Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth shiw, 1987-2004.
MFW is the ratio of funds over fund holder's real assets (including housing).
Table 7: Unsmoothed component: Fund-holders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
yu
t (k) 0.578 0.551 0.750 0.694
(0.062) (0.083) (0.108) (0.088)
Intensive margin:
yu
t (k) * Fund holdings over real net wealth (MFW) 0.101
(0.517)
yu




t (k) * Fraction of fund-holders -1.944
(1.055)
Obs. 112 112 112 112


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Figure 1: Diversication incentives
Source: SHIW, 1987-2004, authors' own calculations.
On the y-axis: fund-holdings over real wealth for fund-holders in region i. On the x-axis: ki from the following
regression of household labor income on regional GDP growth: yki
t = ki(gdpk
t   gdpt) + ki + vki
t where
k=fund-owning households (left panel) or k=all households (right panel).
Figure 2: Trends in share of fund-owners and in ratio of fund volumes over
raw income
Source: SHIW, 1987-2004, authors' own calculations.
Both panels show Italy-wide averages.CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2140 Lorenzo Cappellari, Paolo Ghinetti and Gilberto Turati, On Time and Money 
Donations, November 2007 
 
2141 Roel Beetsma and Heikki Oksanen, Pension Systems, Ageing and the Stability and 
Growth Pact, November 2007 
 
2142 Hikaru Ogawa and David E. Wildasin, Think Locally, Act Locally: Spillovers, 
Spillbacks, and Efficient Decentralized Policymaking, November 2007 
 
2143 Alessandro Cigno, A Theoretical Analysis of the Effects of Legislation on Marriage, 
Fertility, Domestic Division of Labour, and the Education of Children, November 2007 
 
2144 Kai A. Konrad, Mobile Tax Base as a Global Common, November 2007 
 
2145 Ola Kvaløy and Trond E. Olsen, The Rise of Individual Performance Pay, November 
2007 
 
2146 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Yannis Georgellis, Nicholas Tsitsianis and Ya Ping Yin, 
Income and Happiness across Europe: Do Reference Values Matter?, November 2007 
 
2147 Dan Anderberg, Tax Credits, Income Support and Partnership Decisions, November 
2007 
 
2148 Andreas Irmen and Rainer Klump, Factor Substitution, Income Distribution, and 
Growth in a Generalized Neoclassical Model, November 2007 
 
2149 Lorenz Blume, Jens Müller and Stefan Voigt, The Economic Effects of Direct 
Democracy – A First Global Assessment, November 2007 
 
2150 Axel Dreher, Pierre-Guillaume Méon and Friedrich Schneider, The Devil is in the 
Shadow – Do Institutions Affect Income and Productivity or only Official Income and 
Official Productivity?, November 2007 
 
2151 Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Emanuele Massetti and Massimo Tavoni, International 
Energy R&D Spillovers and the Economics of Greenhouse Gas Atmospheric 
Stabilization, November 2007 
 
2152 Balázs Égert and Dubravko Mihaljek, Determinants of House Prices in Central and 
Eastern Europe, November 2007 
 
2153 Christa Hainz and Hendrik Hakenes, The Politician and his Banker, November 2007 
 
2154 Josef Falkinger, Distribution and Use of Knowledge under the “Laws of the Web”, 
December 2007 
  
2155 Thorvaldur Gylfason and Eduard Hochreiter, Growing Apart? A Tale of Two 
Republics: Estonia and Georgia, December 2007 
 
2156 Morris A. Davis and François Ortalo-Magné, Household Expenditures, Wages, Rents, 
December 2007 
 
2157 Andreas Haufler and Christian Schulte, Merger Policy and Tax Competition, December 
2007 
 
2158 Marko Köthenbürger and Panu Poutvaara, Rent Taxation and its Intertemporal Welfare 
Effects in a Small Open Economy, December 2007 
 
2159 Betsey Stevenson, Title IX and the Evolution of High School Sports, December 2007 
 
2160 Stergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya, Persuasion as a Contest, December 2007 
 
2161 Morten Bennedsen and Christian Schultz, Arm’s Length Provision of Public Services, 
December 2007 
 
2162 Bas Jacobs, Optimal Redistributive Tax and Education Policies in General Equilibrium, 
December 2007 
 
2163 Christian Jaag, Christian Keuschnigg and Mirela Keuschnigg, Pension Reform, 
Retirement and Life-Cycle Unemployment, December 2007 
 
2164 Dieter M. Urban, Terms of Trade, Catch-up, and Home Market Effect: The Example of 
Japan, December 2007 
 
2165 Marcelo Resende and Rodrigo M. Zeidan, Lionel Robbins: A Methodological 
Reappraisal, December 2007 
 
2166 Samuel Bentolila, Juan J. Dolado and Juan F. Jimeno, Does Immigration Affect the 
Phillips Curve? Some Evidence for Spain, December 2007 
 
2167 Rainald Borck, Federalism, Fertility and Growth, December 2007 
 
2168 Erkki Koskela and Jan König, Strategic Outsourcing, Profit Sharing and Equilibrium 
Unemployment, December 2007 
 
2169 Egil Matsen and Øystein Thøgersen, Habit Formation, Strategic Extremism and Debt 
Policy, December 2007 
 
2170 Torben M. Andersen and Allan Sørensen, Product Market Integration and Income 
Taxation: Distortions and Gains from Trade, December 2007 
 
2171 J. Atsu Amegashie, American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity 
Contest?, December 2007 
 
2172 Patricia Apps and Ray Rees, Household Models: An Historical Perspective, December 
2007  
2173 Ben Greiner, Axel Ockenfels and Peter Werner, The Dynamic Interplay of Inequality 
and Trust – An Experimental Study, December 2007 
 
2174 Michael Melvin and Magali Valero, The Dark Side of International Cross-Listing: 
Effects on Rival Firms at Home, December 2007 
 
2175 Gebhard Flaig and Horst Rottmann, Labour Market Institutions and the Employment 
Intensity of Output Growth. An International Comparison, December 2007 
 
2176 Alexander Chudik and M. Hashem Pesaran, Infinite Dimensional VARs and Factor 
Models, December 2007 
 
2177 Christoph Moser and Axel Dreher, Do Markets Care about Central Bank Governor 
Changes? Evidence from Emerging Markets, December 2007 
 
2178 Alessandra Sgobbi and Carlo Carraro, A Stochastic Multiple Players Multi-Issues 
Bargaining Model for the Piave River Basin, December 2007 
 
2179 Christa Hainz, Creditor Passivity: The Effects of Bank Competition and Institutions on 
the Strategic Use of Bankruptcy Filings, December 2007 
 
2180 Emilia Del Bono, Andrea Weber and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Clash of Career and 
Family: Fertility Decisions after Job Displacement, January 2008 
 
2181 Harald Badinger and Peter Egger, Intra- and Inter-Industry Productivity Spillovers in 
OECD Manufacturing: A Spatial Econometric Perspective, January 2008 
 
2182 María del Carmen Boado-Penas, Salvador Valdés-Prieto and Carlos Vidal-Meliá, the 
Actuarial Balance Sheet for Pay-As-You-Go Finance: Solvency Indicators for Spain and 
Sweden, January 2008 
 
2183 Assar Lindbeck, Economic-Social Interaction in China, January 2008 
 
2184 Pierre Dubois, Bruno Jullien and Thierry Magnac, Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in 
LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence, January 2008 
 
2185 Roel M. W. J. Beetsma, Ward E. Romp and Siert J. Vos, Intergenerational Risk Sharing, 
Pensions and Endogenous Labor Supply in General Equilibrium, January 2008 
 
2186 Lans Bovenberg and Coen Teulings, Rhineland Exit?, January 2008 
 
2187 Wolfgang Leininger and Axel Ockenfels, The Penalty-Duel and Institutional Design: Is 
there a Neeskens-Effect?, January 2008 
 
2188 Sándor Csengődi and Dieter M. Urban, Foreign Takeovers and Wage Dispersion in 
Hungary, January 2008 
 
2189 Joerg Baten and Andreas Böhm, Trends of Children’s Height and Parental 
Unemployment: A Large-Scale Anthropometric Study on Eastern Germany, 1994 – 
2006, January 2008  
2190 Chris van Klaveren, Bernard van Praag and Henriette Maassen van den Brink, A Public 
Good Version of the Collective Household Model: An Empirical Approach with an 
Application to British Household Data, January 2008 
 
2191 Harry Garretsen and Jolanda Peeters, FDI and the Relevance of Spatial Linkages: Do 
third Country Effects Matter for Dutch FDI?, January 2008 
 
2192 Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse and Theon van Dijk, Price Discrimination Bans on 
Dominant Firms, January 2008 
 
2193 M. Hashem Pesaran, L. Vanessa Smith and Takashi Yamagata, Panel Unit Root Tests in 
the Presence of a Multifactor Error Structure, January 2008 
 
2194 Tomer Blumkin, Bradley J. Ruffle and Yosef Ganun, Are Income and Consumption 
Taxes ever really Equivalent? Evidence from a Real-Effort Experiment with Real 
Goods, January 2008 
 
2195 Mika Widgrén, The Impact of Council’s Internal Decision-Making Rules on the Future 
EU, January 2008 
 
2196 Antonis Adam, Margarita Katsimi and Thomas Moutos, Inequality and the Import 
Demand Function, January 2008 
 
2197 Helmut Seitz, Democratic Participation and the Size of Regions: An Empirical Study 
Using Data on German Counties, January 2008 
 
2198 Theresa Fahrenberger and Hans Gersbach, Minority Voting and Long-term Decisions, 
January 2008 
 
2199 Chiara Dalle Nogare and Roberto Ricciuti, Term Limits: Do they really Affect Fiscal 
Policy Choices?, January 2008 
 
2200 Andreas Bühn and Friedrich Schneider, MIMIC Models, Cointegration and Error 
Correction: An Application to the French Shadow Economy, January 2008 
 
2201 Seppo Kari, Hanna Karikallio and Jukka Pirttilä, Anticipating Tax Change: Evidence 
from the Finnish Corporate Income Tax Reform of 2005, January 2008 
 
2202 Walter Krämer and André Güttler, On Comparing the Accuracy of Default Predictions 
in the Rating Industry, January 2008 
 
2203 Syed M. Ahsan and Panagiotis Tsigaris, The Efficiency Loss of Capital Income 
Taxation under Imperfect Loss Offset Provisions, January 2008 
 
2204 P. Mohnen, F. C. Palm, S. Schim van der Loeff and A. Tiwari, Financial Constraints 
and other Obstacles: Are they a Threat to Innovation Activity?, January 2008 
 
2205 Sascha O. Becker and Mathias Hoffmann, Equity Fund Ownership and the Cross-
Regional Diversification of Household Risk, January 2008 